Applying Normative Theories in EU Competition Law: Exploring Article 102 TFEU by Makris, SS
30 
APPLYING NORMATIVE THEORIES IN EU COMPETITION LAW: EXPLORING 
ARTICLE 102 TFEU 
 
Stavros S. Makris* 
 
 
Abstract: The present study involves an analysis of the two main normative approaches and 
intellectual traditions in competition law: the consequentialist and the deontological. The aim 
is to evaluate their merit in the application of positive law. Especially, this paper examines 
whether the traditional approaches offer a full account of the underpinning rationale of 
Article 102 TFEU and whether CJEU jurisprudence reflects a single intellectual tradition. 
Furthermore, three main legal tests are brought under scrutiny. These legal tests are invoked 
by the CJEU, in order to determine whether an infringement of Article 102 has occurred. The 
tests are associated with the abovementioned normative approaches. The scrutiny of the tests 
seeks to demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of each normative approach in 
specific settings. The argument presented by the current analysis is that the two main 
normative approaches attempt to be holistic and reduce competition law to a single objective 
or goal. This produces serious shortcomings. Thus, it is preferable to adopt a value pluralistic 
normative theory aiming at creating a framework, which accommodates both consequentialist 
and deontological reasoning, when it is objectively justified. In terms of methodology, the 
argument is unravelled in a top-down method: first, it is presented on an abstract, theoretical 
level (Part C) and second, the rationale and application of Article 102 are examined so as to 
assess the general assumptions made in the first part (Parts D and E). 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, the EU authorities and courts have pursued various objectives within the 
framework of European Union competition law (EUCL). Freedom to compete, protection of 
market structure, protection of consumers, economic efficiency and market integration are 
only a few among the numerous goals recognised in positive law.1 The potential conflict 
between the goals of EUCL has often triggered various “hard cases”2 in the jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In the absence of a coherent method for 
judicial decision-making, the plethora of objectives resulted in inconsistency and 
contradiction in CJEU jurisprudence, causing an adjudication problem.3 Several normative 
                                                 
* LL.B. (UoA), LL.M. (UCL). The author would like to thank Dr Ioannis Lianos for his guidance, continuous 
support and insightful comments on the subject. The author’s thanks also go to Stavros Pantazopoulos and 
Michail Risvas for their helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1  Article 2, 3 and Protocol 27 of the Treaty on the European Union [2008] OJ C115/1; Ioannis Lianos, 
‘Competition law in the European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon’ in Diamond Ashiagbor, Nicola Countouris, 
Ioannis Lianos (eds), The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon (CUP 2012). Roger Van den Bergh and 
Peter Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective (2nd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2006) 16-53. 
2 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press 1961) 124-154. 
3 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (7th edn, OUP 2012) 19-20.  
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theories have addressed the question of the goals of EUCL attempting to facilitate the 
resolution of this problem. The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate how normative 
theories of EUCL handle this adjudication problem.4  
 Normative theories are important in the discipline of competition law (CompL). They 
purport to understand the multifaceted phenomenon of competition, influence competition 
policy and suggest a method for decision-making.5 In addition, the normative foundations of 
EUCL affect the judicial decision-making, while, in a dialectical scheme, the Courts' 
jurisprudence influences the way the goals of EUCL are conceptualised.6  
 The plethora of goals can be summarised into two main normative accounts of EUCL. 
Hence, this paper follows a general jurisprudential taxonomy, which distinguishes between 
two main intellectual traditions: the consequentialist and the deontological. 7  The first 
contends that competition is a mere instrument for maximising welfare.8 Thus, promoting 
economic efficiency should be the primary consideration and the telos of EUCL.9 The latter 
tradition argues that competition, which incorporates and reflects the idea of freedom, is a 
value per se.10 Therefore, safeguarding the competitive process and protecting the structure of 
the market must be an all-embracing objective. Both approaches employ a holistic 
perspective so as to reduce EUCL to a single ultimate goal.  
 However, it is submitted that neither is capable of releasing all existing internal 
tensions within EUCL, since both suffer from fundamental incompleteness.11 That being the 
case, value pluralism may offer a more coherent perception of EUCL’s conceptual 
foundations than the other two schools of thought. Value pluralism does not claim to be a 
complete normative theory. It is based on the premise that there is no need for a strict and 
                                                 
4 On the distinction between a positive (what the law actually is) and a normative (what the law ought to be) 
conception of law see Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (OUP 1979) 37-52. 
5 Laura Parret, ‘The multiple personalities of EU competition law: time for a comprehensive debate on its 
objectives’ in D Zimmer (ed), The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012). 
6 David Gerber, ‘The Goals of European Competition Law: Some Distortions in the Literature – Comment on 
Parret’ in D Zimmer (ed), The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012). 
7 Ioannis Lianos, ‘Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law’, (2013) 3 CLES, 1-
13, 31-32. This taxonomy assists in classifying the various objectives and schools to two main intellectual 
traditions in which they are subsumed. 
8 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 
29–32. 
9 Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (Basic Books 1978); Richard Posner, Antitrust 
Law (2nd edn, UCP 2001); Karel van Miert, ‘European Competition Policy’ (Management Policy Council, 6 
May 1998) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1998_053_en.html> accessed 25 August 2013. 
10 David Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Clarendon Press 
1998). 
11 Oles Andriychuk, ‘Dialectical antitrust: an alternative insight into the methodology of EC competition law 
analysis in a period of economic downturn’ (2010) 31 (4) ECLR 155, 163. 
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rigid hierarchical prioritisation among EUCL’s objectives.12 Therefore, it seeks to provide a 
framework which accommodates all the objectives of EUCL and encompasses both 
consequentialist and deontological reasoning when it is objectively justified. In that respect, it 
aims at informing the legal hermeneutics of EUCL and facilitating the settlement of the 
adjudication problem. 
 To assess the merit of the above normative approaches in relation to the adjudication 
problem, a top-down method is adopted.13 This involves a type of deductive reasoning, which 
starts from general assumptions, and, subsequently, narrows down to specific settings.14 The 
specific observations are used to confirm or reject the theoretical assumptions.  
 In the first part, the two main normative approaches with regard to the conceptual 
foundations of EUCL are compared. In addition, the contours of the value pluralistic 
approach are drawn in general terms. The second part is devoted to the analysis of Article 
102 TFEU (Article 102). Article 102 is used as a case study to evaluate the merit or demerit 
of the abovementioned normative approaches. The analytical exercise is twofold: first, it 
assesses whether the traditional approaches offer a full account of the underpinning rationale 
of Article 102; second, CJEU jurisprudence is scrutinised to determine whether a single 
objective motivates the Courts’ judgments.  
 The third part delves into an investigation of the three main legal tests, which the 
CJEU has invoked, in order to determine whether an infringement of Article 102 has 
occurred.15 Each test is associated with a normative approach in CompL discourse. The as-
efficient-competitor test (AECT)16 and the consumer harm test (CHT)17 are interrelated with 
the “effects-based approach” and incorporate consequentialist thinking. On the contrary, the 
test of intent (ToI) induces certain deontological thinking in the legal analysis of “abuse”.18 
Concluding that the so-called holistic approaches cannot fully guide the interpretation and the 
                                                 
12 Abayomi Al-Ameen, ‘Antitrust pluralism and justice’ in D Zimmer (ed), The Goals of Competition Law 
(Edward Elgar 2012) 265-274. 
13  Richard Posner, ‘Legal reasoning from the Top Down and from the Bottom Up: The Question of 
Unenumerated Constitutional Rights’ (1992) UCLR 433; James Griffin, On Human Rights (OUP 2008) 29-30; 
Paul Tomassi, Logic (Routledge 1999) 7-9. 
14 Keith Mason, ‘Do top-down and bottom-up reasoning ever meet’ in E Bant and M Harding (eds), Exploring 
Private Law (CUP 2010) 38-40. 
15 For the distinction between objectives, rules and tests see Renato Nazzini, The foundations of European 
Union competition law: the objective and principles of Article 102 (OUP 2011) 107-108. 
16 Einer Elhauge, ‘Defining Better Monopolisation Standards’ (2003) 56 SLR 253.  
17 Robert O’Donoghue and Atilano Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC (Hart Publishing 2006) 
191–194. 
18 Antonio Bavasso, ‘The role of intent under Article 82 EC: from “flushing the turkeys” to spotting lionesses in 
Regent’s Park’ (2005) 26 (11) ECLR 616-623. 
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application of Article 102, the paper suggests that a first step towards a value pluralistic 
approach of EUCL should be made. 
 
B. NORMATIVE THEORIES IN EUCL 
EUCL should not merely be an empirically formed set of ad hoc rules aiming at settling 
individual cases but rather a coherent and principled field of law. In this part, the paper 
considers how the two main normative approaches of EUCL address this problem. After 
presenting their salient features, it highlights that their incompleteness stems from their 
struggle to be holistic. The third section presents certain arguments for endorsing value 
pluralism and offers a general outline of its potential contribution to judicial decision-making. 
 
1. The Consequentialist Approach 
The topos of the consequentialist approach is that a normative standard should be evaluated 
exclusively depending on its consequences.19 It follows that an institution is justified as long 
as it achieves the greatest net balance of satisfaction for all individuals under its scope.20 In 
CompL discourse, consequentialist thinking implies that the value of competition derives 
from its welfare maximising properties.21 Competition, like every other economic institution, 
is protected because it increases the welfare of society. 22  Thus, EUCL should be 
instrumentalised for enhancing total or consumer welfare without having value per se. 23 This 
view has become the current orthodoxy, since an increasing number of economists, 
practitioners, scholars and authorities suggest that economic efficiency should be the ultimate 
goal of CompL. 24 
 Total welfare is defined as the sum of producer and consumer surplus in a given 
industry.25 This standard is related to the obsolete model of perfect competition, which the 
neoclassical economics postulate. 26  Being based on a purely theoretical and heavily 
                                                 
19 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘Consequentialism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter edn, 2012) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/consequentialism/> accessed 25 August 2013. 
20 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Macmillan 1907) 120-144. 
21 O’Donoghue and Padilla (n 17) 4; Bishop and Walker (n 8) 29–32. 
22 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (CUP 2004) 17–22. 
23 Martyn Taylor, International Competition Law: a new dimension for the WTO? (CUP 2006) 8–12. 
24 Motta (n 22) 17–22; O’Donoghue and Padilla (n 17) 4; Bishop and Walker (n 8) 29–32. 
25 Kenneth Arrow, ‘An Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare Economics’ (1951) Proceedings 
of the Second Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability 507.  
26 Richard Lipsey and Alec Chrystal, Economics (OUP 2011) 136-159. 
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unattainable ideal, such a perception of welfare encounters reasonable criticism, 
notwithstanding that it may lead to welfare loss in the long term.27  
 Total welfare is commonly understood as an application of the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion.28 According to that criterion, “if an economic change results in some persons being 
better off and some worse off, and the winners could compensate the losers in such a way 
that, on balance, everybody was better off, then social welfare is greater even if no actual 
compensation has been made.”29 Defined as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, total welfare ignores 
the demands of distributive justice and this may be particularly detrimental in the European 
Union context.30 
 To say that someone is “better off” or “worse off” indicates that their utility increases 
or decreases, where utility represents a person’s preferences as revealed in their choices.31 
Nevertheless, it is a shaky assumption to claim that choices reflect specific preferences.32 
Moreover, preferences may be irrational or based on false belief,33 be context-dependent34 or 
distorted35 and cannot be compared with each other in relation to their content. Furthermore, 
the satisfaction of preferences may not increase a person's welfare.36 Additionally, focusing 
on preferences delimits competition analysis to the participants of the relevant market.37 
Besides, a person's wellbeing is not simply what makes their life go well, but also what 
makes them a good person.38 Thus, wellbeing includes a non-economic dimension.  
                                                 
27 For a critique of perfect competition see Whish and Bailey (n 3) 7-9; A Buchanan, Ethics Efficiency and the 
Market (Rowman & Allanheld 1985) 14. For a critique of the axioms of rationality see A Sen, Collective Choice 
and Social Welfare (North-Holland 1984) 33-41. For a critic of Pareto optimal see Gregory Goldman, 
‘Simulation and Interpersonal Utility’ (1995) Ethics 109. For a critique to short-term welfare see Nazzini (n 15) 
32-39. 
28 Anthony Kronman, ‘Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle’ (1980) 9 JLS 227, 236; John Hicks, ‘The 
Foundations of Welfare Economics’ (1939) 49 (196) EJ 696-712; Nicholas Kaldor, ‘Comparisons of Utility’ 
(1939) 49 (145) EJ 549-552. 
29 David Winch, Analytical Welfare Economics (Penguin Harmondsworth 1971) 143. 
30 Lianos (n 7) 8-13. 
31 Robin Broadway and Neil Bruce, Welfare Economics (Blackwell 1984) 235-261. 
32 Daniel Hausman, Preference, Value, Choice and Welfare (CUP 2012) 25-31. 
33 Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson, ‘Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Contemporary Moral 
Philosophy’ (1993) JEL 31. 
34 Virgil Storr, Understanding the Culture of Markets (Routledge 2013) 57-82. 
35 Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, New Foundations of Cost Benefit Analysis (Harvard University Press 2006) 
33. 
36 Thomas Scanlon, ‘The Moral Basis for Interpersonal Comparisons’ in Jon Elster and John Roemrer (eds), 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being (CUP 1993) 38. 
37 Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, ‘The General Theory of Second Best’ (1956) 24 (1) The Review of 
Economic Studies 11-32. 
38 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in Morality of Law and Politics (Clarendon Press 1994) 44-
59. 
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 Total welfare is construed, by some authors, in a broad sense as including not only 
economic welfare but also values such as justice, fairness and other public goods.39 However, 
if such a definition of welfare is adopted, the consequentialist approach will be transformed 
into value pluralism, as will be shown below. This also contradicts the main theme of the 
welfarist approaches, according to which even non-economic welfare goals can be described 
in wellbeing terms.40  
 The alternative to total welfare, as many commentators argue is that the objective of 
CompL should be to prohibit behaviour that reduces consumer welfare.41 The main objection 
this standard encounters is that there is no specific, substantive reason for evaluating the 
welfare of consumers as bearing greater weight than that of producers. Moreover, prioritising 
consumer welfare is not likely to foster an economic approach in CompL and provide us with 
easier tests regarding the application of economic analysis.42 In addition, the main argument 
in favour of the consumer welfare objective derives from its potentially redistributive effect.43 
Nonetheless, competition law under such an objective is ill-suited to pursue the redistribution 
of income, since it would be more efficient to realise distributive justice through the tax and 
transfer system.44  
 Moreover, consumer welfare has been used to disguise different objectives and 
ulterior purposes, thus confusing the debate and creating the false impression of a 
consensus.45 Although it was proposed as an instrument to defend economic freedom leading 
to a “lightweight antitrust”, it generated false convictions and unnecessary interventions.46 
Consequently, total welfare should be deemed as a superior objective than consumer welfare, 
since it relies on formal equality of all economic agents and values all economic agents 
equally.47  
                                                 
39 Michal Gal and Eran Fish, ‘Antitrust pluralism and justice-comment on Al-Ameen’ in D Zimmer (ed), The 
Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 285. 
40 Lianos (n 7) 4. 
41 John B Kirkwood and Robert H Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not 
Increasing Efficiency (2008) 84 Notre Dame L Rev 191; Christopher Townley, Article 81 and Public Policy 
(Hart Publishing 2009) 177–181.  
42 Nazzini (n 15) 40-45. For an opposing view, see Steven Salop, ‘Question: What is the Real and Proper 
Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard’ (2010) 22 Loy Consumer L 
Review 336. 
43 Russell Pittman, ‘Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement’ (2007) 3(2) CPI 
205, 207–215. 
44 Louis Kaplow, ‘On the choice of welfare standards in Competition Law’ in D Zimmer (ed), The Goals of 
Competition Law (Edward Elgar). 
45 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise. Principle and Execution (Harvard University Press, 2005) 11-
56. 
46 Eleanor Fox, ‘We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors’ (2003) 26 (2) World Competition 149. 
47 Nazzini (n 15) 49-50. 
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 A detailed analysis of the various differences between total and consumer welfare is 
beyond the scope of this study. What is essential this far is to have demonstrated that these 
concepts reflect consequentialist thinking in EUCL. At the heart of this approach lies the 
following thesis: the good is defined independently from the right, and the right is conceived 
as what maximises the good.48 The consequentialist reasoning will support a conduct that 
generates more good than bad, even if it infringes other values such as freedom. In other 
words, an undertaking's conduct can be deemed “pro-” or “anti-” competitive merely in 
relation to its impact on welfare. Simultaneously, a purported anti-competitive conduct may 
be objectively justified as long as efficiency gains arising from it outweigh its distortive 
impact on competition.  
 This approach enables EUCL to take into account, in the form of “consequences”, all 
the relevant economic evidence for assessing an undertaking's conduct.49  Furthermore, it 
avoids formalistic judgments since the legality of a conduct can be decided on the basis of its 
effects. Moreover, it provides useful analytical tools to deal with the problem of “false 
positives” and “false negatives”.50 Despite that, if competition is a mere instrument to achieve 
efficiency and industrial growth it can be circumscribed on the grounds of an external 
value.51 For instance, both intervention and non-intervention could be justified, amounting to 
a selective and arbitrary protection of competition. This may deprive EUCL of a principled 
approach and reduce it to economics. Hence, the consequentialist approach may undermine 
the very notion of competition. This may transform EUCL into a fragile legal framework 
totally dependent on empirical analysis. 52 
 In addition, economic efficiency cannot accommodate all societal values, since it is 
“unable to comprehend all the dimensions of human motivation and choice”.53 The attempt to 
reduce all significant societal values to rational calculable variables may lead to situations 
where these values are not attributed their due gravity. For example, every restriction or 
violation of freedom or fairness could be legitimised on the basis of welfare maximisation. 
                                                 
48 William Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs 1963) 13. 
49 Ioannis Lianos and Christos Genakos, ‘Econometric evidence in EU competition law: an empirical and 
theoretical analysis’ (2012) 6 CLES Working Paper Series. 
50  A false positive occurs when an authority, adopting an over-inclusive test, incorrectly considers a pro-
competitive behaviour as abusive, leading to false convictions. A false negative emerges where, under an under-
inclusive test, an anti-competitive behaviour is not prohibited, amounting to false acquittals. See Whish (n 3) 
193; Arndt Christiansen and Wolfgang Kerber ‘Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead 
of “per se” vs Rule of Reason’ 2006 2 (2) JCLE 215. 
51 Oles Andriychuk, ‘Thinking Inside the Box: Why Competition as a Process is a Sui Generis Right – a 
Methodological Observation’ in David Zimmer (ed), The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012). 
52 Andriychuk (n 11) 157-163. 
53 Lianos (n 7) 13. 
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Diminishing the role of freedom and fairness may turn competition into an unjust institution. 
Accordingly, consequentialist thinking cannot provide a complete normative justification of 
EUCL, since it does not take all societal values equally seriously.54 Nonetheless, total welfare 
should be a value in EUCL and a significant element of every competition analysis, yet it 
cannot be an all-encompassing objective. 
 
2. The Deontological Approach 
The foundation of the deontological approach is that competition constitutes an end in itself, 
separate from the outcomes, which may be produced for consumers, economic efficiency, 
market integration or industrial growth. The process itself contains a significant economic 
importance and cannot be abolished, even if it is not always the most effective mode to reach 
welfare maximisation.55 Consequently, the process of competition should be protected on its 
own right as a sui generis right.56 
 The Ordoliberal School holds a prominent role in the deontological tradition. For 
ordoliberals, freedom is the essence of competition; therefore, its protection should be the 
principal goal of EUCL.57 Freedom to compete in a market with undistorted competition is 
dialectically intertwined with political freedom, namely the capability to participate freely in 
a fair political game.58 Likewise, a democratic polity requires and presupposes a free and fair 
market.59 The ideal is a social market economy where the rule of law is respected and state 
intervention aims to protect freedom from being abusively exercised.60 From this perspective, 
                                                 
54 This point may rise from the critique Rawls advances against teleological theories in John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (revised edn, Harvard University Press 1999) 19-24. 
55 Andriychuk (n 51) 95-99. 
56 Roger Zach and Adrian Künzler, ‘Freedom to Compete or Consumer Welfare: The Goal of Competition Law 
according to Constitutional Law’ in Roger Zach, Andreas Heinemann and Andreas Kellerhals (eds), The 
Development of Competition Law – Global Perspective (Edwar Elgar 2010) 76. 
57 David Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the “New” 
Europe’ (1994) 42 AJCL 71-73. 
58 Oliver Budzinski, ‘Monoculture versus Diversity In Competition Economics’ (2008) 32 CJE 305. 
59 Viktor Vanberg, ‘The Freiburg School: Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism’ (2011) 4 Freiburg Discussion 
Papers on Constitutional Economics 
 <http://www.eucken.de/fileadmin/bilder/Dokumente/Diskussionspapiere/04_11bw.pdf> accessed 25 August 
2013. 
60 E-J Mestmaker, ‘The development of German and European competition law with special reference to the EU 
Commission’s Article 82 Guidance of 2008’ in Lorenzo Federico Pace (ed), European Competition Law: The 
Impact of the Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 (Edward Elgar 2011) 25, 41. 
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EUCL should strive to realise a humane order for society. 61  It should be one of the 
foundations upon which liberal democracy and the economic constitution are established.62   
 Consequently, CompL must impose constraints on the exercise of both state and 
private power as the political institutions restrain the accumulation of political power.63 To 
achieve this, it should be oriented towards the ideal of complete competition, namely, 
competition in which no firm has power to coerce other firms in the relevant market.64 
Complete competition is articulated under an “as if’ standard. According to this standard, 
where market power cannot be eliminated, the bearer of it “should act as if constrained by 
competition”.65 In that context, companies should be able to compete with each other and 
pursue their commercial interests while a strong regulatory framework would limit the 
capacity of the powerful market players and restrict the state from intervening in a manner 
distortive of market structure.66  
 Being principles-based, the deontological approach addresses the question of whether 
an action is right or wrong. 67  It contends that a conduct can be right regardless of its 
consequences. Its correctness stems from its compatibility with a rule. Therefore, the 
deontological approach is grounded on value judgements and induces moral reasoning and 
evaluations in the discipline of CompL. The main objection against the deontological 
approach is that, since it values the competitive process irrespective of its consequences to 
the social welfare, it ignores economic analysis thus resulting in inflexible dogmatism.68 
Once a commercial practice is categorised as impeding competition, its distortive effect on 
the market will be implied, without any ad hoc analysis.69  
                                                 
61 Frank Maier-Rigaux, ‘On the normative foundations of competition law – efficiency, political freedom and 
the freedom to compete’ in Daniel Zimmer (ed), The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 132, 139.  
62 Giuliano Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: Dilemma of Liberal Democracy in the History of the 
Market (Hart 1997) 36. 
63 Gerber (n 10). 
64 Gerber (n 57) 50-52; Walter Eucken ‘The Competitive Order and Its Implementation’ (C Ahlborn and C 
Crave trs) (2006) 2(2) CPI 219. It should be highlighted though that complete competition is a rather static view 
of competition and, contrary to its advocates, seems to be close to a perfect competition ideal. Under complete 
competition the price is to be fixed in such a way that offer and demand are in equilibrium and marginal costs 
are just covered. 
65 Gerber (n 10) 252. 
66 Eucken (n 64) 248. 
67  Larry Alexander and Michael Moore, ‘Deontological Ethics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter edn 2012), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/ethics-deontological/> accessed 28 
August 2013. 
68  Christian Ahlborn and Atilano Padilla, ‘From Fairness to Welfare: Implications for the Assessment of 
Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition Law’ in CD Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds), European 
Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 83 EC (Hart Publishing 2008). 
69 Lianos (n 7) 25. 
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 It would appear that competition, as an economic phenomenon, could be better 
understood through the language of economics.70 Certainly, economic concepts, as soon as 
they enter into the province of law, become part of it.71 Nevertheless, it cannot be argued that 
any form of deontological thinking denies efficiency considerations based on sound 
economic tools.72 In addition, the deontological approach engages in a different form of 
practical reasoning in comparison to the consequentialist approach. These elements are 
necessary for the application of the law.73 For instance, practical reasoning may restore the 
necessary link between legal categorisations and effects. Moreover, it highlights the 
importance of value judgements in EUCL discourse, providing a comprehensive justification 
for judicial decisions. For these reasons, the Court has developed, in many cases, an 
institutional conception of freedom and a comprehensive notion of fairness. 
 Furthermore, the deontological approach promotes an essential component of legal 
thinking: categorical thinking. 74  Categorisation may ensure legal certainty and reduce 
enforcement costs. It may also enable the interpreter of the law to distinguish which evidence 
is relevant in each case. For this purpose, categories should rely on empirical evidence and 
the moral and legal principles inherent in law. Undoubtedly, these categories should be 
subject to revision according to economic theory.75 On this account, completely diminishing 
the importance of the deontological approach might prove destructive for the application of 
EUCL.76 
 
3. Beyond the Holistic Approaches: Value Pluralism 
Since the two main normative theories are not prescriptive enough to provide adequate 
guidelines for decision-makers and interpreters, a paradigm shift is necessary.77 The starting 
position of value pluralism is that there is no need for a strict hierarchical prioritisation 
among EUCL’s objectives. 78  A paradigm that encloses both consequentialist and 
                                                 
70 Ioannis Lianos, ‘Lost In Translation? Towards a Theory of Economic Transplants’ (2009) 62 Current Legal 
Problems 353. 
71 Raz (n 4) 163-209.  
72 Maier-Rigaux (n 61) 163. 
73 Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon Press 1978) 19-53. 
74 Ioannis Lianos, ‘Categorical Thinking in Competition Law and the ‘Effects-based’ Approach in Article 82 
EC’ in Ariel Ezrachi (ed), Article 82 EC – Reflections on its recent evolution (Hart 2009) 35-37. 
75 ibid 36-49. 
76 Andriychuk (n 51) 106. 
77 Andrichuck (n 11) 163 
78 Al-Ameen, (n 12) 267-270. 
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deontological reasoning would be more appealing when objectively justified.79 Thereby, the 
CJEU would decide every case through tailoring general principles to the specific context. 
Not being confined to a single tradition of reasoning, the Courts would be able to avoid the 
shortcomings of each tradition. 
 Firstly, the historic, societal and conceptual contexts of EUCL imply the absence of a 
single, unifying policy. Competition authorities and the EU Courts have not adhered to a 
specific “pure” normative theory. CompL does not exist in a vacuum, but is dialectically 
interwoven with the values of the society to which it pertains. It should reflect and promote 
various values.80 Therefore, it would be misleading to claim that the holistic approaches are 
more feasible than a new, not yet fully articulated theoretical paradigm. 
 Taking into consideration that CompL accommodates various competing interests and 
values, it is permeated by “reasonable disagreement”. Reasonable disagreement synopsises 
the fact that in a heterogeneous society, people genuinely disagree about fundamental 
values.81 Public institutions rely on an array of irreducible independent values. Therefore, a 
legal regime should be reasonably accommodating, since social life is too rich in complicated 
details to permit resort to monistic overarching values. This is the only way to deal with the 
fact of reasonable disagreement. The phenomenon of competition cannot be reduced to a sole 
value. In addition, the morality inherent in EUCL is not based on a unitary value.82 Hence, 
the EUCL should be pluralistic in nature and seek for an “overlapping consensus”.83 
 Moreover, value pluralism is compatible with the notion of workable competition. 
The latter is a pragmatic ideal, since it rejects the very notion of perfect competition.84 
Workable competition can be determined by a wide range of criteria such as economies of 
scale, low barriers to entry, or no impairment of freedom of choice. Value pluralism can 
provide further criteria for achieving workable competition. In addition, it can be aligned to 
reality-based economics and embrace their realistic assumptions or empirically founded 
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knowledge.85 For instance, a pluralistic approach is not committed to the homo economicus 
model which lies at the heart of the welfarist approaches.86 
 For that purpose, value pluralism attempts to provide a framework for ascertaining 
and balancing between the different goals that competition law promotes.87 Notwithstanding 
that fact, such an approach encounters a serious objection. It may be regarded as arbitrary or 
too theoretical to be applied by the courts. The answer to that objection is twofold: First, the 
potential arbitrariness could be diminished by an objective list of values that should be 
promoted.88 This general guide of goals based on empirical evidence may assist the Court in 
reaching a context-specific and principled decision. Second, should the CJEU engage in 
practical reasoning and value-judgements, it will be able to gradually form a coherent 
adjudication method. In other words, it would be illusory to argue that a single-value 
framework makes value-judgements redundant.89 
 A further function of value pluralisms could be that of providing a normative standard 
for interpreting positive law. This may be illustrated by the case of legal tests. Legal tests are 
articulations of the rules that the Court has developed so as to apply the law. Particularly in 
EUCL, these tests attempt to extricate restrictions of competition from anti-competitive 
behaviour. First, a potential test would be endorsed only if proven compatible with the values 
of EUCL. 90  Stated otherwise, under value pluralism, each test invoked in the Courts’ 
jurisprudence should satisfy a minimum requirement comprising values such as economic 
freedom, fairness, total welfare and legal certainty inter alia. Second, provided that a test is 
prima facie attuned to EUCL, value pluralism may highlight its shortcomings by invoking 
different goals from the one that triggered it. For example, a test prima facie compatible with 
EUCL will be considered less appealing when it is demonstrated that it involves costs 
surpassing its benefits. 91  Thereby, it will be complemented by other tests or totally 
abandoned.  
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C. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
So far the two main accounts of EUCL’s conceptual foundations have been presented, this 
paper arguing that their potential completeness disguises their shortcomings. This increases 
the appeal of a value pluralist perspective of EUCL. The first section of this part examines 
whether the holistic approaches offer a coherent account of the role Article 102 TFEU plays 
in EUCL. The second section scrutinises whether the CJEU endorses a single ultimate goal in 
relation to Article 102. A value pluralistic approach is supported by the conclusion that the 
Court endorses a plethora of goals concerning Article 102, as its reasoning often invokes 
deontological and consequentialist thinking. 
 
1. Re-thinking Article 102: Form v Effects 
Article 102 is the cornerstone of EUCL on abuse of market power. It stipulates that unilateral 
practices of dominant undertakings should be deemed abusive in case they constitute a 
restriction of competition. Early case law on Article 102 can be summarised through two 
principal discussions: first, the Court examined whether the undertaking in question was 
dominant; and second, it assessed its practice in terms of form irrespective of its economic 
effects.92 The threshold for dominance was set relatively low and its satisfaction implied a per 
se prohibition of certain behaviour.93 Under this formalistic approach, a dominant firm was 
condemned merely due to its superior efficiency and market position and regardless of the 
effects of its conduct.94  This approach was correctly criticised for protecting the competitors 
rather than the competitive process, while it ignored current economic thinking.95 Mistakenly 
though, the root of the form-based approach was associated with deontological thinking in 
general.96  
 The publication of the European Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102] EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary 
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (Guidance) proclaimed a departure from the form-based 
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approach.97 Contrary to the approach followed so far by the Court, the Guidance attempted to 
introduce an effects-based approach concerning the interpretation of Article 102. The main 
feature of this approach was that it did not rely on the nature of the dominant undertaking’s 
conduct or on in abstracto evaluations.98 Aiming at providing a solid economic foundation to 
Article 102, it developed a twofold test: first, a dominant undertaking’s conduct can be 
deemed abusive due to its actual effects; second, an infringement of Article 102 could be 
based on a theory of harm, namely on an assumption that certain factual findings may cause 
harm to the consumers. Moreover, the adoption of the principle of objective justification 
introduced a “dialectical debate”, where the Commission bears the burden of proving a prima 
facie infringement of Article 102, and the defendant should produce evidence of efficiencies 
with a sufficient degree of probability.99  
 The Guidance quickly became a useful point of reference summarising previous 
jurisprudence in a coherent manner while it paved the way for more economic-based rules 
and legal tests. The Commission in many cases, although not formally obliged to do so, 
scrutinised the effects of the practice in question.100 Following the same line, but not without 
oscillations, the Court gradually endorsed this approach, requiring proof of anti-competitive 
effects when it examined an allegedly abusive practice.101 
 Nevertheless, the deontological approach was falsely associated with formalism and 
per se presumptions.102 The origins of this confusion may lie in the fact that Article 102 was 
deemed an “ordoliberal provision”.103 Subsequently, the Ordoliberal School was criticised for 
protecting “the competitors and not competition” and for inducing per se presumptions in 
EUCL.104 However, ordoliberal thinking does not necessarily prohibit the accumulation of 
power per se. It can be construed merely as making a value judgement, according to which 
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the EUCL should prevent economic freedom from destroying its own prerequisites.105 It 
follows that economic freedom has an institutional character and is closely related to the 
structure of the market. This salient insight remains a value in the EUCL framework. Thus, 
even if Article 102 was an “ordoliberal provision”, it should not have been biased in favour 
of competitors and against efficient dominant undertakings. What is more, the deontological 
approach is not confined to ordoliberal thinking. It induces practical reasoning and a 
workable form of categorical thinking in the EUCL; it may allow per se presumptions yet it 
does not necessitate them. Hence, it should not be mistakenly equated with the sterile and 
inadequate form-based approach. 
 The modernisation of Article 102 was necessary at the time, since its implementation 
had been throwing sand in the wheels of the market.106 The effects-based approach moved the 
EUCL away from crude deontological thinking, but it did not introduce a pure 
consequentialist account of Article 102. Should a fully-fledged effects-based approach have 
been endorsed, a mere analysis of the effects of a business conduct would have been 
sufficient for finding an abuse. This would imply that efficiency is not just a value embedded 
in Article 102 but rather its ultimate goal. Therefore, every categorisation under Article 102 
should have been rejected as formalistic.107  
 The current approach combines both consequentialist and deontological thinking.108 It 
allows for taking into consideration the empirical evidence, while it demands a detailed 
economic analysis of them. Forming more economic-based rules neither exiles certain 
deontological thinking from EUCL nor does it substitute the law with economic analysis.109 
Simultaneously, categorisations are indispensable to handling the indeterminacy of a pure 
consequentialist approach.110 For instance, categorical thinking is necessary for articulating a 
theory of harm or conducting a counterfactual test. Hence, the effects-based approach on 
Article 102 is not based exclusively on consequentialist thinking. 
 In the search for the objective of Article 102, all normative approaches struggle to re-
join one main question: under what circumstances should an undertaking’s freedom to trade 
be prohibited? In other words, under which conditions should an undertaking’s free trade 
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activity be proscribed by Article 102? Despite its importance, there is no single, formal 
European Union document or decision establishing a single objective for Article 102.111 The 
Guidance may have endorsed consumer welfare as the basis for its enforcement priorities, yet 
it accepts “the significance of ensuring the competitive process in the internal market”.112 
Moreover, consumer welfare is not the only value that the Court has called on and cannot be 
an ultimate objective due to its various implications.113  
 Unequivocally, EUCL should be utilised to enhance consumer welfare and increase 
efficiency. 114  Nonetheless, the markets should be kept open and fair while promoting 
innovation. 115  In that respect, Article 102 seeks to protect a multitude of values and 
objectives. Concisely, protecting the undistorted competitive process for the benefit of the 
consumers should be held as the underpinning rationale of Article 102. As a result, the limits 
imposed on the unilateral conduct of a dominant undertaking by Article 102 should aim to 
protect the market structure and the competition as a process, so as to avoid consumer harm. 
Therefore, the multitude of objectives which constitute the underpinning rationale of Article 
102 lead to a pluralistic perspective. Contrary to the holistic approaches, this perspective 
recognises that the understanding and the coherent application of Article 102 requires a 
conceptual framework in which both consequentialist and deontological thinking coexist.  
 
2. Pluralism in CJEU Jurisprudence 
It has been illustrated that both the consequentialist and the deontological school of thought 
cannot wholly explain the current approach concerning the interpretation of Article 102. This 
section examines whether the CJEU favours the plurality of goals or if the Courts’ decision-
making can be reduced to a single and ultimate objective. 
 Beyond doubt, the notion of economic efficiency is central to the CJEU reasoning. 
Firstly, “dominance” is defined as “a position of economic strength which enables an 
undertaking to prevent effective competition”. 116  Furthermore, any reference to public 
interest induces a total welfare standard. Restrictions of competition may stem from abusive 
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practices which undermine the public interest and the wellbeing of the EU.117 Furthermore, 
the CJEU has highlighted that “efficiencies should be taken into consideration under the 
overall economic assessment of the conduct at hand”. 118  In other words, it has to be 
determined whether the allegedly anti-competitive effect arising from a dominant 
undertaking’s practice can be “outweighed by its advantages in terms of efficiency”. 119 
Additional support to welfarist approaches is given by the Guidance, which adopts a 
consumer welfare standard and allows for allegedly anti-competitive conduct to be 
objectively justified. 120  The Commission’s “economic approach” may lean on a 
consequentialist standard such as “consumer welfare”, but undoubtedly, courts and 
competition authorities are nowhere near adopting this standard as an ultimate objective. 
 Influenced by ordoliberal thinking, the EU Courts have proclaimed that the “special 
responsibility” of the dominant undertaking “does not allow its conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competition”.121 If anticompetitive effects were the rationale of the said special 
responsibility, all firms with market power would bear such a responsibility. 122  Market 
access, equality of opportunity and protection of freedom to compete have also triggered the 
recognition of such a responsibility. In her Opinion in British Airways, AG Kokott contended 
that Article 102 “is not designed only or primarily to protect the immediate interests of 
individual competitors or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus 
competition as such”.123 
 Furthermore, in many cases the Court associates individual wellbeing with the single 
market imperative, highlighting that Article 102 should seek to preserve undistorted 
competition in the market so as to increase social welfare.124 In GlaxoSmithKline, the Court 
utilised the notion of final consumers and consumer choice to restrict a dominant 
undertaking’s freedom to compete and establish a link between restrictions of parallel trade 
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and anti-competitive effects.125 Therefore, it recognised that market integration and consumer 
sovereignty might impose certain limitations to economic freedom.  
 In addition, the principle of fairness has inspired many Court judgments. The CJEU 
has consistently held that “a system of undistorted competition can be guaranteed only if 
equality of opportunity is secured among the various economic operators”.126 Additionally, 
equality of opportunity indicates that as-efficient rivals should be on equal footing in the 
relevant market.127 For instance, dominant undertakings should abstain from predation since 
it is deemed “unfair”. 128  By the same token, rebate schemes pursued by a dominant 
undertaking were found to be abusive when they proved to be unfair to the affected 
consumers.129 
 To conclude, the main question under Article 102 is how to distinguish between 
abusive behaviour and competition on merits. The European courts may have induced certain 
deontological thinking in the application of Article 102. Nevertheless, when this started to 
amount to formalism, an effects-based approach emerged, attempting to modernise our 
understanding of the relevant provision.130 This consequentialist interpretive attitude has not 
been boundless. Other goals, besides efficiency, have prescribed the limits of the effects-
based approach and have emphasised the necessity of categorical thinking. The Court has 
been interpreting EUCL under a framework of multiple objectives without relying solely on a 
single objective or school of thought.131 Such an approach indicates that EUCL adheres to 
goals pluralism and validates the main thesis of value pluralism. 
 
D. ARTICLE 102 UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: THE LEGAL TESTS  
In this part, three main tests regarding an infringement of Article 102 are brought under 
scrutiny. The AECT and the CHT stem from the consequentialist approach.132 The ToI is 
grounded on an effects-based test, yet transcending it as it engages in certain deontological 
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thinking.133 Should a single test be applicable to all conceivable abusive practices, it would be 
implied that there is indeed an ultimate objective of Article 102 from which the relevant test 
derives.134 Thereby, a pluralistic approach will have to be refuted.135 
 
1. The As-Efficient-Competitor Test (AECT) 
It is a generally accepted idea that by protecting less efficient competitors, there is an 
unavoidable risk of protecting competitors rather than competition itself.136 Seeking to avoid 
such an incident, the CJEU in a series of cases developed the as-efficient-competitor test 
(AECT).137 Its rationale is that the most efficient firm should be the competitive winner.138 
Thus, harmful, anti-competitive exclusion should be distinguished from “exclusion” as a 
result of undistorted competition on the merits.139 For that purpose, the AECT examines 
whether a dominant undertaking’s conduct constitutes an exclusionary practice by foreclosing 
from the relevant market an as-efficient rival. 140  Consequently, practices such as tying, 
bundling or conditional rebates pursued by a dominant undertaking are deemed abusive only 
if they are capable of such a foreclosure effect. 
 In AKZO, the Court held that prices above average variable cost (AVC) but below 
average total cost (ATC) are abusive if they form part of an exclusionary plan that intends to 
eliminate an equally efficient competitor.141 In Deutsche Telekom, the Court considered as 
abusive a dominant undertaking’s pricing practice (margin squeeze). According to the 
Court’s reasoning, these practices were capable of a foreclosure effect to the detriment of 
competition on the merits.142 In TeliaSonera, the AECT indicated the existence of margin 
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squeeze. Should a dominant firm be unable to offer its retail services other than at a loss, it 
follows that competitors who are potentially excluded by the relevant practice should be 
deemed as-efficient.143 
 By applying the AECT the Court avoided a form-based approach and held that pricing 
practices, such as conditional rebates, price discrimination, predatory pricing and margin 
squeeze are not per se exclusionary. These practices should be regarded as abusive only when 
they are linked to certain anti-competitive effects. The latter are established by demonstrating 
that an equally efficient competitor is excluded from the market due to the relevant pricing 
strategy. 
 The AECT is consistent with the principle of economic freedom. Article 102 is not 
there to prevent an undertaking from becoming, on its own merits, dominant on the market. 
Freedom to compete should, by definition, amount to the exclusion from the market of the 
less efficient competitor. 144  Whether inefficient companies can actually survive in 
competition with the efficient ones is a question to which the answer should only be revealed 
in the course of competition. Moreover, only conduct that constrains the freedom of action of 
other market actors, without being objectively justified or bringing efficiency gains, should 
be prohibited as abusive. 
 Furthermore, the AECT allows a dominant undertaking to benefit from its superior 
efficiency, while it remains neutral towards all undertakings, distinguishing them solely 
under the objective criterion of efficiency. Nonetheless, a question of fairness may arise. It 
can be argued that freedom of market access, which reflects equality of opportunity, should 
not be protected or prevented on the basis of current efficiency.145 It is possible for the 
dominant undertaking to exclude its competitors so as to repudiate them from achieving their 
minimum efficiency standards.146 For instance, the costs for a new entrant will most likely be 
higher than those of the dominant firm until economies of scale are fully achieved. Should the 
dominant firm in such a market pursue a potentially abusive practice, it may eliminate a new 
entrant’s opportunity to achieve the minimum efficient scale. Thus, the competitor is 
prevented from becoming as efficient as the dominant firm by the conduct of the latter. 
Accordingly, on certain occasions the AECT does not fully realise the principle of fairness 
and should be complemented by other legal tests. 
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 The AECT deals properly with the incentives problem by adopting the efficiency of 
the dominant firm as a benchmark. On the one hand, actual and potential competitors, 
knowing that they can succeed only by advancing superior efficiency than the dominant 
undertaking, will have a strong incentive to be more efficient than the dominant firm. On the 
other hand, the dominant firm retains the incentive to increase its efficiency since it is not 
deterred by an authority’s intervention from acting in accordance with its commercial 
interests. 
 In addition, achieving adequate legal certainty is considered a significant advantage of 
the AECT. Dominant firms are able to predict the legality of their conduct, being required to 
know solely their own cost-structure so as to assess their performance ex ante.147 However, 
when applying for conditional and multi-product rebates the AECT insists on additional 
information regarding the structure of the market.148 Moreover, the AECT cannot readily be 
applied to non-price conduct such as tying and bundling, inasmuch as there is no certain way 
of determining what the counterfactual price would have been.149 
 As indicated above, the AECT is mainly justified economically on grounds of actual 
economic welfare. In principle, the short-term welfare effects of the test are deemed to be 
clear. It allows, for instance, a dominant undertaking to solely offer the rebates which the 
less-efficient competitor cannot offer. Thereby, the less-efficient competitors are excluded 
from the market and both total and consumer welfare increase.  
 Notwithstanding, in particular cases, excluding a less-efficient competitor may be 
incompatible with social welfare, raising the problem of false negatives.150 For instance, the 
entry of a less-efficient rival can improve total welfare in occasions where the gain in 
allocative efficiency outweighs the harm caused to productive efficiency.151 Hence, it should 
be accepted that the AECT cannot provide a unified theory of the assessment of different 
forms of abuse.152   
 In certain cases, non-intervention regarding the exclusion of a less-efficient 
competitor may allow the dominant firm to defend a market position from which a net long-
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term welfare loss may follow.153 Over time, inefficient companies can turn into as-efficient 
companies since competition is an open-ended process. This problem can be solved if the 
AECT is supplemented by another test that appraises whether the excluded competitor 
provided an “effective competitive constraint” on the dominant firm.154 
 To conclude, the AECT strives to deal with a fundamental contradiction that lies 
beneath all law in relation to abuse of market power. In other words, it attempts to safeguard 
rivalry by curtailing it. As demonstrated above, this test can be under-inclusive and over-
inclusive, allowing certain false positives and false negatives. As a result, it does not always 
contribute to welfare maximisation. Furthermore, in some instances it is not fully satisfactory 
from a fairness perspective, while at the same time, the legal certainty it provides can be 
called into question. Whilst it is inappropriate as the sole and single test for exclusionary 
abuses, it remains a useful test. 
 
2. The Consumer Harm Test (CHT) 
The CHT is an effects-balancing test which focuses on the consequences of the conduct on 
total or consumer welfare. Its salient assumption is that consumer harm can be caused by 
maintaining or strengthening market power and subsequently by raising prices or restricting 
output.155 Under this standard, an exclusionary conduct violates EUCL in case it diminishes 
competition without fully offsetting these potential adverse effects. 156  Accordingly, an 
exclusionary conduct should be deemed abusive as long as it does not fully benefit 
consumers.157 Hence, the CHT makes illegal any conduct by which a dominant undertaking 
strengthens its market position causing net harm to consumers. 
 The principle of fairness may endorse the CHT. Such a test allows for an objective 
consideration of the negative and positive effects of certain conduct in a neutral and 
principled way. Furthermore, limiting a dominant undertaking’s freedom to compete on 
grounds of consumer harm cannot be held as arbitrary. Economic freedom does not include 
practices that harm consumers, insofar as such practices constitute abusive exercise of the 
relevant freedom. Hence, economic freedom and fairness do not provide any reasons for 
abandoning the relevant legal test. 
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 At first glance, the CHT seems to be a clear test providing legal certainty. It claims 
that a conduct is anti-competitive only if it harms consumers.158 However, it may impose a 
significant administrative challenge to the courts for it requires conducting an open-ended 
scrutiny of the effects of the practice in question.159 This entails a comparison between a 
current and a hypothetical situation. Moreover, economists’ ability to accurately measure the 
net consumer-welfare effects of particular conduct and judges’ ability to evaluate this 
evidence are confined by certain limitations.160 Since dynamic effects are often difficult to 
assess, the CHT may lead courts to focus too much on static, short-run consumer effects. 
Even if the relative short-term economic effects are evaluated, there could not be an accurate 
economic assessment of the long-term effects on innovation and risk-taking.161 At the same 
time, it would be difficult for firms to predict whether their conduct violated Article 102.  
 Be that as it may, a total welfare standard dictates adopting CHT. In a well-
functioning market, it can be expected that firms will pass on their lower costs to consumers 
through lower prices, better services or investment in research and development. Nonetheless, 
the administrative difficulties of a CHT may reduce a dominant firm’s incentives to engage in 
pro-competitive practices. It should be highlighted that the standard of proof for establishing 
consumer harm is relatively low; it is not required to prove the existence of an actual or a 
direct consumer detriment.162 Consequently, it may lead dominant firms to abandon conduct 
that would generate efficiencies and be beneficial to total welfare in the long run. 163 
Therefore, the over-deterrence effect of the test subjects it to false positives. Nevertheless, 
under the CHT a dominant firm may attempt to objectively justify its conduct by suggesting 
that it generates efficiencies which outweigh the harm to consumers.164 Conversely, it is 
rather difficult for the defendant to establish objective justifications and thereby outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects.165 
 On the other hand, reinforcing the standard of proof in the application of the CHT 
may give rise to systematic false acquittals and under-deterrence.166 That being the case, it 
will become very difficult for the claimant to establish consumer harm and, subsequently, the 
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test will ex ante incentivise dominant firms to engage in anti-competitive conduct. To avoid 
false negatives an enhanced dominance threshold should be required.167 Adopting such a 
standard implies that exploitative abuses are be committed only by a monopolist or quasi-
monopolist.168  
 In conclusion, given its open-ended nature as an effects-balancing test and its inherent 
unpredictability, the CHT cannot be the general test for analysing conduct under Article 102. 
By the same token, the CHT has been reasonably criticised as being over-inclusive and over-
deterrent. In cases where the standard of proof of consumer harm is high and its application 
becomes exacting, the test tends to produce false acquittals and under-deterrence. 169 
Moreover, if its scope is limited to short-run consumer effects, it may ultimately harm, rather 
than benefit, consumers.170  All things considered, the CHT cannot be the single test for 
finding an infringement of Article 102. It should be complemented by the other legal tests 
and supported by the residual values of EUCL. Integrated in such a framework, the CHT may 
offer optimal results. 
 
3. The Element of Intent 
The Test of Intent (ToI) introduces a form of categorical thinking onto the application of 
Article 102. More importantly, the ToI recognises the limits of a purely consequentialist 
approach and attempts to complement any assessment of the effects of a conduct.171 The ToI 
asks whether the behaviour in question is irrational “but for” its capability of eliminating or 
lessening competition”.172 Additionally, when evidence of economic effects is dubious, the 
element of intent clarifies whether the conduct has an anti-competitive purpose or is aligned 
with competition on its merits. 
 The first objection to the ToI is that an anti-competitive intent can be readily confused 
with the intent to succeed in the market.173 This raises the risk of false positives.174 Such a 
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criticism is based on the fact that competitive and exclusionary behaviour may seem 
similar.175 In that respect, it presupposes that intent is a subjective element of the conduct 
itself. Nevertheless, if that were the case the ToI would be incompatible with EUCL since, 
pursuant to well-established CJEU jurisprudence, abuse is an “objective concept”. 176 
Furthermore, should a court find an infringement of Article 102 solely based on the state of 
mind of the perpetrator, that would trespass our legal intuitions, according to which no one 
should be punished for their evil intention.177 Hence, intent should be judged only after the 
aim, the context, the means, and the effects of the conduct in question have been thoroughly 
assessed. In order to be relevant, evidence of intent must relate to the intention to engage in 
conduct that does not fall within the scope of competition on the merits.178 
 For that purpose, ToI is established through a profit sacrifice test, which indicates 
whether or not a dominant undertaking’s conduct makes economic sense. 179  The profit 
sacrifice test appraises a dominant firm’s behaviour as abusive if it sacrifices profits or incurs 
losses to an extent that would not make economic sense but for eliminating or excluding its 
rivals from the relevant market. 180  This test is used especially for identifying predatory 
pricing as long as “predation in any meaningful sense cannot exist, unless there is a 
temporary sacrifice of net revenues in the expectation of greater future gains”.181 This test 
was adopted by the Court in AKZO where it was held that pricing above AVC but below 
ATC is to be considered abusive “only if prices at that level are determined as part of a plan 
for eliminating a competitor”.182 
 Furthermore, the ToI may assist in reducing false convictions when objective data 
have proved inadequate for the finding of an infringement and an additional element is 
necessary to affirm anti-competitiveness. In other words, the ToI attempts to grasp the 
incentives and purposes of the dominant firm and examine the relation between them and the 
means engaged in their realisation. 183  As an example, evidence of a deliberate plan to 
eliminate an efficient competitor can play a role in cases where a cost test is insufficient to 
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establish a prima facie predation.184 Thus, in fact, intent as a supplementary element of an 
anti-competitive practice guards against the risk of false convictions and over-deterrence.185 
 Another objection against the ToI is that it allows for false negatives. However, this 
argument cannot be accepted since intent is an objective notion relying on facts used to 
complement other empirical tests. This may be elucidated if we examine the practice of tying. 
Due to the severe uncertainty of counterfactual type tests in cases of tying, the CHT should 
be considered an inadequate test. Particularly, it is very difficult to prove that tying raises 
prices or restricts output.186 The investigation with regard to the foreclosure effect conducted 
by the Court has been insufficient. An additional element was required to reason its 
findings.187 In Tetra Pak II, for instance, the Court held that the relevant firm intended to 
make the tying product wholly dependent on the tied, which thereby amounted to a 
foreclosure effect.188 Undoubtedly, intent plays a key role in determining whether a tying 
practice is anti-competitive, since it allows the Court to take into account the overall strategy 
of the dominant firm. It is also induced so as to establish a capability of market foreclosure.189 
Likewise, many scholars argue that a recoupment requirement should be a necessary element 
of the test, thus minimising the risk of false convictions.190 
 Following that, proof of intent may complement the shortcomings of other tests. As 
demonstrated above, the AECT may diminish effective competitive constraints and deprive a 
less efficient competitor of the opportunity to become an equally efficient one. In such a 
situation, evidence of a deliberate plan to exclude a competitor would in itself indicate that 
this competitor operates as an effective constraint on the dominant undertaking. 
 Be that as it may, it can still be argued that unintended practices that have a harmful 
effect on competition can be economically explained. As a result, these practices will not be 
prohibited under such a standard.191 Moreover, the profit sacrifice test may not be suitable in 
cases where the conduct in question is commercially rational, yet it has certain exclusionary 
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effects, making some rather no economic sense.192 Similarly, not all types of abuse involve a 
profit sacrifice. For instance, raising a rival’s costs could not be prohibited under a profit-
sacrifice test.193  
 These criticisms have merit and should be used to recognise the limits of the ToI. 
Therefore, intent cannot be an indispensable prerequisite for finding an abuse. It should 
always be supported by a substantive test of exclusionary conduct.194 It can be used as an 
analytical tool, contributing to the avoidance of false positives and false negatives. It covers 
some of the deficiencies of the other tests.195 Moreover, intent could reasonably bridge the 
gap between detrimental effects and theories of consumer harm.196 In addition, the element of 
intent should be taken into account to determine the gravity of the infringement when setting 
fines.197 Given that, intent can play a key role in the application of Article 102. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Positive law does not provide a strict framework of the objectives of EUCL, thus creating a 
normative conundrum. Choosing and balancing among protection of freedom to compete, 
preservation of an open and fair market, promoting innovation, industrial growth, welfare 
maximisation, consumers’ protection and single market integration have caused a permanent 
concern for the CJEU. In a series of hard cases where the Court had to choose among 
conflicting goals, its findings have been unsatisfactory, or at least not widely accepted, thus 
undermining its legitimacy. Normative theories have striven for a long time to resolve this 
conundrum and subsequently facilitate the resolution of this adjudication problem. 
 The aim of this study was to assess whether the prevailing normative theories can in 
fact resolve the adjudication problem. It started with a critical evaluation of the two main 
normative approaches in EUCL. The various theories were categorised into two main 
approaches: the consequentialist and the deontological. The first argues that efficiency should 
be the ultimate objective of EUCL and thus CompL should be operationalised as an 
instrument for maximising welfare. The second doctrine focuses on the, inherent to 
competition, value of freedom. This argues that CompL should opt to realise a political or 
moral conception of freedom. Both approaches intend to unravel the abovementioned 
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normative conundrum by providing an exegesis of what competition is and subsequently 
what objectives CompL should pursue. However, their endeavour to reduce EUCL to a single 
value or goal makes them susceptible to substantial criticism. On the contrary, value 
pluralism negates the idea that there can be strict causational links of subordination between 
the objectives of EUCL. As a result, the EUCL should promote a multitude of supplementary 
goals. 
 The second substantive part examined whether the two main approaches can identify 
the underpinning rationale of Article 102 and explain CJEU jurisprudence. The purpose of 
this investigation was to assess whether the current normative approaches can elucidate 
Article 102 and guide its interpretation. That being the case, these approaches would be able 
to resolve the adjudication problem concerning Article 102. Nonetheless, positive law and its 
application by the Court support the view that EUCL pursues a plethora of goals. A 
pluralistic perspective is further endorsed by the conclusion that the Court invokes 
deontological as well as consequentialist reasoning to deal with the disputes brought before it. 
 The third part focused on the three tests applied for finding an infringement of Article 
102. Given that no single test is suitable for application to all conceivable abusive practices, a 
test-plurality has been increasingly appealing. Concluding that the holistic approaches cannot 
provide complete guidance in the interpretation and application of Article 102, the paper 
suggests that a first step towards a value pluralistic perspective of EUCL should be made. 
Whether it can develop into a complete normative and adjudicative theory is to be appraised 
in the future. 
